As the impressive U.S. military rout of the Taliban regime and the terrorists
they harbored enters a new phase, some in Washington propose a similar strategy
for Iraq. I argue against this for several reasons and propose a non-military
solution. Indeed, a carefully revamped weapons inspections process may well
provide the answer.
As a primary matter, all of Iraq's neighbors prefer a united Iraq to a fractured
one. It would be difficult to guarantee Iraq's unity by arming Kurdish forces in
the North and Shiite forces in the South. The Shiite rebels in Iraq maintain
ties with Shiite Iran. Iraqi Kurdish groups have a long history of struggling
for Kurdish autonomy from Baghdad and a newly formed Iraqi Kurdistan could
incite the restless Kurdish minority in Turkey to rebel against Istanbul. This
eventuality could well spiral into a wider and undesired conflagration. While
U.S. military superiority is certain to unseat the Baghdad regime, the aftermath
is far less clear and America could well loose control of the situation on the
ground.
More importantly, war should be the last resort and not the first priority. This
leads to the question of why weapons inspections have failed and whether they
can be redrafted to work. It is difficult to answer the first part precisely.
Although UNSCOM has admitted to destroying much of Iraq's weapons of mass
destruction (WMD), it was unable to certify full Iraqi compliance. Certainly,
the fact that the U.N. commission dismantled more chemical and biological
weapons than the allies had destroyed during the Gulf War is evidence that
weapons inspections have worked and can work.
But attitudes need to change if a new weapons inspections regime is to be
effective. Clearly, Baghdad must demonstrate greater willingness to cooperate
than it has in the past. Political roulette is a sure recipe for failure. But
equally important, Washington must unequivocally declare its respect for Iraq's
independence and integrity. This would require that the United States abandon
its long standing commitment to the overthrow of Saddam Hussein and embrace the
U.N. mandate to disarm Iraq instead.
Clinton administration affirmations that the United States had no intention of
lifting the crippling economic sanctions on Iraq until the Baath regime was
overthrown served to undermine the weapons inspections process. The public
debacle over Washington's alleged interference with UNSCOM's mandate and the
resignation of key members of the commission only reinforced the perception in
Baghdad that Washington was not really after Iraq's compliance or disarmament
but after the regime's ouster. Baghdad's perception that it is "damned if it
does and damned if it doesn't" must change if weapons inspections are to be
effective.
Therefore, what is called for right now is a serious reexamination of each
side's attitude and of the inspections process itself. A newly reconstituted
inspections regime must address a few loopholes in the original formulation.
First, the specific steps that Iraq must take to satisfy the commission's
requirements of "full compliance" must be spelled out in detail. Any ambiguity
can create a situation of an ever moving "goal post." This scenario would cause
each side to question the motives of the other and would frustrate the process.
Second, some oversight would be required to ensure that the new inspections team
remains wholly scientific and independent of any external pressure or
interference. Secretary General Kofi Annan may even assume this oversight role
himself or delegate a trusted associate. The possibility that the new team could
be comprised of capable inspectors from "neutral" countries (particularly
European) should be seriously considered.
Third, the new mandate must unambiguously endorse the lifting all economic
sanctions once Iraq has fully complied.
Fourth, some meaningful monitoring mechanisms need to be put in place after
economic sanctions have been lifted to ensure that Iraq does not reconstitute
its weapons programs.
Finally, I believe that these collective steps can form the basis of a long
overdue resolution to the Iraq dilemma. The economic sanctions have exacted a
heavy toll on the Iraqi people. We have a moral obligation not only to protect
ourselves from weapons of mass destruction but also to end the decade of
suffering of the Iraqi people. This proposal can form a blueprint for achieving
both.
John Absood lives in Ann Arbor, Michigan.
http://www.lbbs.org/lakdawalalec.htm